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Abstract—In dynamic spectrum access, commercially-operated
database servers are often used to assist the opportunistic users
(OUs) to query and access spectrum vacancies of incumbent users
(IUs). The query and answer process in such DSA architectures
introduce significant privacy concerns for potential leakage of the
sensitive operational details of the IUs, especially their locations.
Existing privacy-preserving mechanisms such as location cloaking
or spatial obfuscation can be used to hide IUs’ locations. They
however cannot guarantee the interference from all surrounding
access-allowed OUs staying under a given limit. In addition,
the spectrum utilization (i.e., transmission opportunities) of OUs
should also be considered in the design of mechanisms. The
complex three-way tradeoff among privacy, interference and
utility has not been systematically studied in the literature. In this
paper, we first endeavor to tackle this challenge, by introducing
a privacy zone within the exclusion zone. In the privacy zone
the IU’s location is indistinguishable, while the exclusion zone
guarantees the interference limit within the privacy zone. Under
two variants of the system model (either known OU locations
or probabilistic locations with known density), we formulate and
solve corresponding optimization problems to find the optimal
tradeoff of one versus the other two objectives. Simulation results
with real-world maps/parameters show that the IU’s privacy
increases with decreasing OUs’ utility given a fixed allowable
interference for the IUs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) allows opportunistic
users (OUs) to access the spectrum that is unoccupied or
ineffectively used by the incumbent users (IUs) [1]. Database-
driven DSA have been approved by FCC as one of the
key architectures for increasing the spectrum utilization [2].
Major IT service providers offer free open-to-public spectrum
database services, such as Google [3] TV white space database
and Microsoft Spectrum Observatory [4]. In addition, FCC
adopts the three-tier spectrum sharing framework to protect
the IUs including authorized federal and satellite services
currently operating in the the 3.5 GHz Citizens Broadband
Radio Service (CBRS) band [5].
The spectrum databases collect and store detailed informa-
tion about IUs’ activity, such as the geo-location, frequency
and time of transmitter/receivers which is very sensitive infor-
mation. Therefore, much concern has been raised regarding
the operational privacy of IUs [6]. For example, imagine a
military base operating a passive radar in the 3.5 GHz band.
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If its location is recorded by a spectrum database, the location
can be leaked when a database is compromised by hackers.
Even if the database is well-protected, malicious OUs can issue
multiple spectrum access queries to the server from different
locations that ultimately allow them to pinpoint the location
of the radar. Leakage of such sensitive information would put
the safety of the personnel inside the military base and their
equipment in danger. Therefore, protecting IU’s operational
details, most importantly its geo-location, is a critical need.
To protect an IU’s location, a straw-man approach is to
apply spatial cloaking techniques [7], [8]. The idea is depicted
in Fig.1(a), where the IU first randomly perturb its real location
x into a nearby x 0, and then the disk centered by x 0 (including
x) is reported to the spectrum server, for which we call a
privacy zone (PZ). In this way, x is indistinguishable (equally
probable) with all other locations within the PZ, similar to
the notion of k-anonymity [9]. However, this approach cannot
guarantee OUs’ interference to the IU is always under the
allowable limit. If the spectrum access query result solely
depends on whether OUs are inside the PZ or not (all the
OUs outside this PZ are allowed to transmit), when IU’s true
location x is near the boundary of the PZ, the interference
from nearby OUs right outside of the PZ can be high.
On the other hand, the traditional way of protecting the IU
from OUs’ interference is to designate an exclusion zone (EZ)
surrounding the IU [10], [11], inside of which all the OUs must
be silent. The size/radius of the EZ can be tuned according to
the IU’s allowable interference resulting in a tradeoff between
the IU’s interference protection and the OUs’ transmission
opportunity. This is illustrated in Fig. 1(b), where the red
crosses denote the active OUs and the green squares inside of
the EZ are the inactive OUs. However, such techniques were
not designed with privacy as a criterion, since the IU is usually
located at the center of the EZ uploaded to the database, which
can be inferred by both the database and the OUs.
To resolve the above dilemma (reconcile both IU privacy
requirement and interference constraints), we will need to
introduce two zones (EZ and PZ) simultaneously, which is
shown in Fig. 1(c). The IU’s possible location is within the PZ,
while no OU is allowed to transmit inside the EZ. Thus, the
region between the PZ’s and EZ’s boundaries can be viewed as
a “buffer zone” that prevents interference to IUs in the worst
case. This new approach gives rise to an interesting three-way
tradeoff among the IU’s privacy, received interference, and
OU’s utility (transmission opportunity). Intuitively, if we fix













Figure 1: (a) Privacy Zone (PZ); (b) Traditional Exclusion Zone (EZ); (c) PZ is contained in the EZ.
by the IU will decrease but the area that can be allowed for
OUs to access the spectrum will be less. If the IU cares about
its privacy, it could make both PZ and EZ very large, but that
would result in low spectrum utilization defeating the purpose
of DSA. Also, the IU may have an incentive to allow more
OUs to access its spectrum (e.g., it gains more revenue since
it leases more spectrum to OUs). On the other hand, if the size
of EZ is fixed and we enlarge the PZ, the IU’s privacy will be
higher but its interference in the worst case will increase as
well. Consequently, an optimal balance should be made among
IU’s privacy, interference, and OUs’ utility when designing the
query and answer mechanism with spectrum databases.
In this work, we endeavor to quantify the above three-way
tradeoff, under two different scenarios. First, we consider the
case when the OUs’ locations are known to a spectrum access
server (SAS) allowing us to obtain a concrete estimation of the
interference received by the IU. For this case, we formulate
an optimization problem to maximize the OUs’ transmission
opportunity under a given interference constraint and privacy
level. We prove that the problem is convex and can be
solved by selectively shutting down some OUs outside the PZ
according to the IU’s interference constraint. Then, we studied
a more general case where the SAS cannot know the specific
location of each OU but only know the OUs’ distribution
density and the maximum transmission power. We focus on
the scenario that OUs are distributed randomly according to
Poisson point process [12] over an area that can be regarded as
infinite. For privacy protection, we choose a perturbed location
in the center of a PZ that contains the IU; to guarantee the
worst case expected interference, we surround the PZ with
a circular EZ where no OU can transmit. We formulate a
non-linear optimization problem [13] and derive the optimal
radii of the EZ and PZ using the iterative optimality condition
decomposition [14] algorithm. In both cases, our solutions
preserve IU’s location privacy since they ensure all the possible
locations of OUs inside the PZ, including IU’s true location,
satisfy the same interference constraint, and the IU uniformly
positioned at random inside the PZ.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to define and quantify the three-way tradeoff between IU’s
privacy, interference and OU’s utility for database-assisted
DSA. We introduce the novel concept of placing a PZ inside
of a EZ to protect the IU’s privacy and limit OUs’ interference.
(2) For deterministic OU location case (DOL), we formulate
an optimization problem that maximizes the OU’s utility under
a given interference constraint. We show that the problem is
convex and present a simple algorithm to achieve the optimal
transmission opportunity for OUs.
(3) For the case when OUs’ density is known, called the
Probabilistic OU location case (POL) case, we formulate a
non-linear optimization problem that optimizes either EZ’s or
PZ’s radius under a non-linear interference constraint.
(4) Simulation results based on real data of a military
base and commercial cellular base station locations have
been presented. Our result show that for the same EZ size,
decreasing the allowable interference would shrink the size
of PZ, and the ratio of PZ radius over EZ’s increases almost
linearly with higher interference.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we give a brief literature review. In Section III, we describe
the system model. The problem formulation and solution are
depicted in Section IV. Section V presents the simulation
results. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
On of the early focuses of DSA was cooperative spectrum
sensing paradigms, and their privacy concern is mainly on
protecting OUs’ locations rather than the IUs’ [15]. Recently,
Database-assisted spectrum access [16] has been introduced to
overcome the cooperative spectrum sensing shortcomings such
as its technical implementation difficulty, high deployment
cost, and its tendency to be overly conservative by preventing
the utilization of vacant channels as reported by FCC [17].
Spectrum databases monitor spectrum availability by a com-
bination of information including IU activity prediction, IU
push updates, and channel propagation modeling, thus IU’s
operational privacy becomes more important. While many
privacy preserving techniques have been proposed in other
settings such as location-based services (LBS), they are either
not directly applicable to DSA or only partially address the
challenges in DSA as OUs’ interference is not considered.
Early techniques focused on location obfuscation or spatial
cloaking [18], where a user’s location is made indistinguish-
able among other K   1 users, which satisfies the notion of
K-anonymity [19]. This can be applied to DSA; for example,
Zhang et al. [20] proposes to ensure OUs’ K-anonymity
by making the SU query K locations surrounding its actual
location, while the IU’s K-anonymity is met by grouping K
IUs together as one virtual IU to enlarge their protection
region. Li et al. [21] apply k-anonymity to protect OUs’
location privacy by making an OU submit queries for k
channels, instead of one, to confuse the attackers and prevent







Figure 2: System architecture and query process.
Although these schemes achieve location privacy, they don’t
take into account the OUs’ interference to the IU and require
existence of K   1 other users or waste spectrum resources.
To enhance the utility while satisfying formal privacy def-
initions, Andres et al. [22] proposed geo-indistinguishability,
which is a variant of differential privacy [23]. Their mechanism
adds two dimensional Laplacian distribution noise to user’s
real location before uploading to an untrusted server. Various
metrics, such as information-theoretic and estimation error,
were proposed to quantify and optimize location privacy [24].
However, they all focused on the setting, in which the utility
is defined as the location error, quite different from the
interference and spectrum utilization in the DSA setting. In
[6], Bahrak et al. used additive noise perturbation and privacy
zone shape transfiguration to protect the IU against the location
inference attacks performed by the OUs. This work first define
an EZ for each IU that protect it from interference and then
a number of K IUs are grouped together inside a larger EZ,
which becomes also a PZ in the mean time, to achieve k-
anonymity. However, this method degrades OU’s transmission
opportunity as grouping excludes large areas containing OUs.
Also, the interference is not explicitly calculated or optimized.
Finally, cryptographic techniques [15] protects IU and/or
OU locations by encrypting them. In [25], Troja et al. adopted
private information retrieval for protecting OUs’ query loca-
tion privacy while taking into account OU’s mobility. Dou et
al. [26] presented a privacy-preserving SAS design that pro-
tects IU’s privacy through secure computation on the ciphertext
domain based on homomorphic encryption, so that the IU’s EZ
information is hidden from the SAS. Chen et al. [27] designed
a secure protocol for database-driven spectrum sharing by
combining secure computations and message authentication
codes to enable verification. However, in all the crypto-based
schemes, the exact query results must be revealed to the SAS
and OUs, which still suffer from IU location inference attacks.
The high computation/communication overhead introduced
by encryption and decryption is also a concern. While we
aim at preventing IU location inference, our schemes can be
integrated with secure computation techniques to protect both
IU’s and OU’s location privacy.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we provide an overview to the system
architecture, assumptions, and threat model.
A. Spectrum Sharing Architecture and Query Process
We consider three types of entities: Incumbent Users
(IUs), Opportunistic Users (OUs), and the spectrum access
server (SAS) (shown in Fig. 2). IUs can be a govern-
ment/military/commercial user which cares about its opera-
tional privacy. For simplicity, we consider a single IU for
now; we will discuss how to extend our results into multi-IU
cases later in the paper. The SAS collects and stores spectrum
vacancy/activity information of the IU and answers access
queries from OUs. Typically, an IU uploads its exclusion
zone (EZ), channel access activity and access time period
to the SAS (can either be push or pull-based updates). The
OUs access the spectrum opportunistically by querying SAS.
The query includes an OU’s location yi and the channel/time
period it wishes to access, its intended transmission power,
SAS checks the database and returns a binary answer – ‘1’ if
yi < E Z and the requested channel/time is available (granted
access), and ‘0’ otherwise (denied access).
The above architecture and query process follows the ex-
isting database-assisted spectrum sharing models, such as the
FCC approved three-tier model [5] and the TV white spaces
[2]. In this paper, for privacy protection, we assume that
the IU computes its EZ and in addition to PZ, based on
certain information of the OUs. We consider two different
scenarios: (1) We assume that all the potential OUs’ locations
are known in advance to the SAS who forwards them to
the IU in a request. This can be obtained when the OUs
register themselves to participate in the system (to get initial
authorization). Alternatively, the SAS can wait until all the
OUs submit their queries and then forward their locations in
the request. This model is mainly suitable for static OUs. (2)
The OUs’ locations cannot be known in advance and we follow
a commonly adopted assumption and assume they follow a
Poisson point process [12]. The density   can be obtained
from general location statistics data such as a heat-map, or
prior query histories, which is also accessible by the IU. This
could be achieved in reality as large companies like Microsoft
and Google already have a spectrum access databases which
the SAS uses. Hence the IU know the number of spectrum
access requests from a specific area and use it to estimate  .
This model is applicable to mobile OUs as well since the exact
location of OUs are not needed ahead of time. We believe that
our modifications are compatible with existing models. In this
work, privacy protection of the IU’s active channel or time are
not considered, which will be extended in our future work.
B. Threat Model
We assume that some of the OUs are curious about IU’s
operational details, who will perform inference attacks to
estimate the IU’s location x. They could be commercial com-
petitors, enemies, or blackmailers. To carry out the inference,
one OU can launch multiple spectrum queries using different
locations (could be faked), or multiple OUs can collude
with each other to submit queries if a rate limiting/location
verification mechanism is deployed by the SAS. If a traditional
EZ is adopted (IU is located at the center of EZ), with an







Figure 3: Intersection attack.
estimate the location of IU through an “intersection attack”.
That is, for each query that returns ‘0’, it means that the IU
is located within a circle with radius equal to the transmission
range of the IU (up to an error margin), centered at the OU’s
query location. This scenario is shown in Fig.3.
In addition, the SAS can also be untrusted. We assume it is
honest-but-curious (i.e., it will honestly execute the protocol
but is interested in the operational details of the IUs too). This
is due to either possibilities of a data breach or compromise
of the SAS by external hackers, or insiders within the SAS’s
organization who may peek into the stored sensitive IU profiles
and reveal/sell them to third-parties. This is especially relevant
considering that nowadays most spectrum databases are hosted
by cloud/Internet service providers.
That said, we assume that the adversary cannot physically
measure the IU’s location (e.g., via deploying multiple sensors
nearby the IU and use tri-lateration techniques). It would be
quite costly, since in the real-world, the sensitive regions are
typically physically protected. However, the adversary knows
the algorithm used by the IUs to generate their EZ/PZ, and the
inputs (OU locations or density, except the IU’s location and
internal random coin flipping) and outputs (EZ/PZ, and query
results) can be eavesdropped by the attacker. Note that all the
communication links can be encrypted and the eavesdropping
happens at the SAS/OUs. We don’t assume adversary possess
precise background knowledge about IU’s locations, other than
the default uniform prior distributions over a certain region
(e.g., knowing that a radar is inside a military base).
IV. THE THREE-WAY TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY,
INTERFERENCE, AND UTILITY
In this section, we define the design objectives and formu-
late the three-way tradeoff between the IU’s privacy, interfer-
ence, and the OUs’ spectrum utilization. We formulate relevant
optimization problems for the DOL and POL scenarios and
characterize the tradeoffs by deriving optimal solutions.
A. Definitions
1) Privacy Metric: Since the IU’s goal is to prevent the
adversary (SAS and OUs) from inferring its true location x,
we can use conditional entropy (H(X |E Z, PZ)) to quantify the
remaining uncertainty given the information available to the
adversary, that is, the EZ and PZ uploaded by the IU. Note
that, the EZ does not provide any additional information about
x, since by design, we know that the IU cannot reside in the
region between the PZ and EZ. Thus, it is safe to say that
H(X |E Z, PZ) = H(X |PZ):
Definition 1 (Privacy (P)). Let random variable X represent
the IU’s location. The privacy P of the IU is defined as the
conditional entropy H(X |PZ), i.e, the uncertainty about X
given the knowledge of PZ.
When X has a uniform prior distribution, H(X |PZ) is
maximized when the posterior probability is uniform:
P(X = x |PZ) = 1|PZ | , 8x 2 PZ, (1)
where |PZ | is the size of the PZ. In other words, by publishing
the PZ, the IU’s location is indistinguishable among all the
locations in the PZ. Note that, P(X = x |PZ) is inversely
proportional to the PZ size. In addition, H(X |PZ) increases
with the PZ size. Thus, in the rest of the paper, we focus on
the PZ size as the privacy objective. In the DOL case, the
PZ consists of K discrete location cells. In the POL case, the
PZ is a disk of continuous points, so the area is ⇡r2 and the
probability density function should be used instead.
Note that, for non-uniform prior knowledge, the optimal PZ
generation mechanism that maximizes the conditional entropy
depends on that prior knowledge, and does not have a simple
analytic form. We leave the treatment of this non-uniform case
as future work. Note also that, although differential privacy
(DP) [22] protects against adversaries with arbitrary prior
knowledge, it only provides indistinguishability guarantees
between two locations, but doesn’t offer a concrete guarantee
in terms of posterior probability of location inference. Also,
DP mechanisms such as geo-indistinguishability incur non-
uniform posterior (i.e., higher inference probability for points
near x, under the same PZ size).
2) Interference: The normal operation of IU requires that
the total interference from active OUs is under a certain
threshold. Thus, we define interference as follows:
Definition 2 (Interference (I)). The aggregated interference
experienced at location j from the set of active OUs SA
is defined as Ij =
Õ
i2SA Ii j , where Ii j is the interference
caused by the ith OU at location j, and I is the maximum
aggregated interference experienced by any location in PZ:
I = maxj2PZ Ij .
The calculation of Ii j for all pairs of OU i and j 2 PZ
can be achieved by channel modeling. In the DOL case, the
exact interference can be computed since we know the OUs’
locations in advance. For the POL case, we can only calculate
an expected interference based on the distribution of OUs.
I represents the worst-case aggregated interference the IU
receives from all the active OUs (as the IU could be located
anywhere in the PZ).
3) Utility Definition: To guarantee interference constraints
we need to selectively deny spectrum access to a subset
of OUs. However, this will impact the spectrum utilization.
Our goal is to preserve the transmission opportunity of the
OUs. To quantify this, we could try to use a concrete metric
such as throughput, or quality of service, which are however







Figure 4: The Deterministic OU location (DOL) model.
schemes, channel conditions and interference among the OUs,
and the channel access protocols, etc. Also, computing such
metrics only adds complexity without adding more insight for
the tradeoff. Thus, we use the number of OUs that are granted
access to represent OUs’ transmission opportunity:
Definition 3 (Utility (U)). We define the OUs’ utility U as the
number of OUs that are granted access (allowed to transmit).
In the case of DOL, this number is exact. In the case of POL,
this is an expected number of OUs.
B. Problem Formulations
The three-way tradeoff between P, U, and I can be
represented by the following general formulations:
F1 : {max P | I  ITH, U   UTH }, (2)
F2 : {min ITH | P   Pth, I  ITH,U   UTH }, (3)
F3 : {max U | P   Pth, I  ITH }, (4)
where Pth , ITH . UTH represent privacy, interference and
utility thresholds, respectively. For the IU, we would like
to guarantee that its worst case interference caused by the
permitted spectrum access of all OUs is below a threshold,
denoted as ITH . To maintain IU’s privacy, this constraint must
hold for every point inside the PZ. For the DOL case, the
solution of I is deterministic since the exact OU locations
are known. Given this knowledge, it’s sufficient to shut down
some SUs to form an EZ that satisfies ITH . For the POL case,
the expected interference is calculated as we only have density
 . The EZ in this case is a disk-shaped area around the IU.
The use of a specific formulation depends on the importance
of a given objective function to be optimized. For example, for
F1, maximizing P subject to interference and utility constraints
means that F1 is prioritized P over I and U. We will observe,
in the subsequent sections, that some formulations are equiva-
lent, i.e., they give the same solutions under similar conditions.
Also, we will see a formulation could be easier in terms of
finding a solution than the others which makes it favorable.
Furthermore, some formulations could be integrated together
to jointly optimize two metrics, privacy and interference for
example, which we will see later in the results section.
C. The Deterministic OU Location (DOL) Case
In the DOL setting, we assume that the set Y = {yi}Ni=1
of the OUs’ locations are known in advance to the SAS.
The IU utilizes both its own location x and the known OUs
locations to generate the PZ. To ensure countability when
calculating interference, we divide the PZ into a finite number
K of discretized grid cells. The IU is located in one of these
cells, which are contiguous to minimize the utility loss for
the OUs. To satisfy our privacy definition, the IU should
generate the PZ by choosing a contiguous set consisting of
K grid cells uniformly at random, from all possible such sets
that contain the IU’s location inside. This can be achieved in
practice by first generating one fixed-shape area as a mask,
and then randomly select one of the cells and fix it to be
the IU’s location x, thus fixing the PZ. The basic idea is
depicted in Fig.4. We choose the square shape to represent
the PZ cells for two reasons: a) the square shape is one of the
shapes that leaves no spacing when aggregated which makes
the PZ cells contiguous b) makes it easy to force the same
interference threshold ITH over all the cells. However, for
the overall shape of the PZ, any geometric shape, would be
technically equivalent as the PZ is adjusted randomly around
the IU irrespective of the shape, which delivers the same
privacy level even if the overall PZ is not square.
The EZ is implicitly formed when the IU selects, by
optimization, a subset of surrounding OUs to deny their
spectrum access, which will guarantee ITH to be met for all
the cells inside PZ. To compute the interference from the i-
th OU to the j-th cell in the PZ, we can use any existing
signal propagation model, however, we use a path-loss model
to represent the interference which has two merits. First, it
simplifies the calculations. Second, it gives the upper bound
on the experienced interference [28]. Hence, the interference






where di j is the distance between the ith OU’s location yi
and the center of the j-th cell in the PZ, and ⌘   2 is the
path-loss exponent. When ⌘ = 2 the worse case is achieved.
Let a binary variable vi denote whether the i-th OU is granted
access to access the spectrum. And as said before, the total
interference experienced at cell j from the set of active OUs
SA is I =
Õ
i2SA Ii j .
To guarantee the privacy of the IU, we enforce that the
I  ITH , for every cell inside the PZ (not only the IU’s
cell). Otherwise, if some cell in the PZ does not meet the
interference constraint, the adversary can easily deduce that
the IU is not located in that cell. Thus, in the IU’s optimization
formulation, this interference constraint must be the same for
every cell in the PZ to prevent OUs from inferring of the
IU’s true location. Recall that the utility of OUs corresponds
to number of active OUs. Alternatively, this can also be
represented as the aggregated communication capacity of all
the active OUs (neglecting the scheduling and interference
among them). The capacity Ci of the i-th OU is B log2(1+ PiNo ),
where Pi is the ith OU’s maximum power which is assumed
to be a constant Po, and No is the noise power and B is the
bandwidth. Note that OUs’ utility is important for the spectrum
access system as well, as OUs pay it for spectrum access.
Summarizing, to maximize OUs’ utility and limit the in-
terference to the IU while maintaining achieving privacy, we
formulate the DOL problem according to choose F3. We
choose for F3 because it is hard for the IU to put a UTH











s.t. 0  vi  1; 8i = 1...N (7)Õ
N
i=1 Ii jvi  ITH ; 8 j 2 PZ, (8)
where vi is the decision variable. Note that, to avoid an integer
program, we use a continuous decision variable vi to denote
the percentage of maximum power Po that the i-th OU can
transmit at. When vi = 0, OU is denied access completely by
the SAS. If vi = 1 the OU can transmits with full power.
If 0  vi  1, the OU transmits with Pivi can also be
viewed as the probability of shutting down the ith SU. The
interference constraints are presented in (7). This problem is
a convex optimization problem with linear constraints. Thus,
this problem can be solved in polynomial time. We use set SD
to denote those OUs denied access. The procedure of DOL is
described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: DOL procedure.
Input: ITH , Y, N , Po and x.
Step 1: Given the desired level of privacy, K is chosen,
and given K , the PZ’s overall shape is formed such that
the cells are contiguous.
Step 2: The IU selects uniformly at random PZ from the
group of all sets with size K that contain x.
Step 3: The IU solves the DOLP.
Output: SD , SA and {vi, 8i 2 SA} is sent to SAS
Let’s reason about why privacy is achieved in this case.
First, all the PZ cells experience interference no more than ITH
as a result of the interference constraint. Secondly, since the
IU’s location is randomly fitted to one of the PZ cells, and the
optimization solution is deterministic given the PZ, no matter
what is the pattern of the actual interference experienced by all
the points in PZ, it is uncorrelated with the IU’s true location.
In other words, the posterior probability P(X = x |PZ) will be
uniform over all the PZ cells such that
P(X = x |PZ) = 1
K
. (9)
D. The Probabilistic OU Location (POL) Case
In reality, knowing the OUs locations may not be practical.
Also, the optimal solution of the DOLP changes as the OUs
move. In this section, we analyze the case where the OU
spatial distribution is statistically known. To make the tradeoff
analysis tractable, we assume that the OUs are distributed over
an infinite area around the IU with density   users per unit area
according to a Poisson point process [29], which is equivalent
to the uniform distribution in the a 2D space. Although the OU
locations may follow a different spatial distribution, a Poisson
process allows us to analytically quantify the privacy, interfer-
ence, utility tradeoff. The results qualitatively extend to other
spatial distributions. Another advantage of the probabilistic
location model is that, the detailed location information of
each OU is not disclosed to the IU or SAS, which protects the
OUs’ location privacy. The query procedure can be protected
using privacy-preserving computation schemes.
The IU does not know the active number of OUs nor their
exact locations. In POL, the PZ is a circular area with a
perturbed location x0 as its center and radius r1, where x
0 is
drawn randomly and uniformly from a another circular with
radius ru . This step is necessary to make sure that the x
0
doesn’t have any relation with x other than they are included
in the same circle. Also, we use the uniform distribution to
choose x0 , will decrease the privacy. For example, suppose
we have the Laplacian distribution for choosing x0 . In this
case, the OU will implicitly know that choice of x0 will
always be concentrated around x0 , a property of Laplacian
distribution [30], which will decrease the efficiency of the PZ.
In order to maximize the IU’s security, the PZ needs to be
carefully designed. Also, in order to limit the interference at
the IU, we surround the IU with another protective circular
region called the EZ with radius r2 as shown in Fig. 5.
Inside the EZ, the OUs are shut down by a request made
by the IU to the SAS. Therefore, the IU can control the
interference it experiences by shrinking and expanding the EZ
,i.e, decreasing or increasing r2. However, to achieve location
indistinguishability, the interference experienced by all the PZ
points must be below the same threshold ITH .
Since the SAS cannot know the detailed location of each
OU, it cannot calculate the corresponding interference gener-
ated by each individual OU to the IU. Instead, the interference
now on a certain point y on the PZ is sum off the interferences
caused by all the OUs, outside EZ, that surrounding y.
However, we only know the   on a circular area A with a
variable radius r which ranges from r2   r1, because there is
no OUs inside the EZ, to 1. For every value of r , a circle has
an average number of OUs = 2⇡r  and each OU on this circle
B(y, r) produces interference Por ⌘ . Therefore, to calculate
the aggregated interference IA of A on y, we must integrate




Por ⌘ (2⇡r) dr . (10)
We have the following remarks about (10). First, as depicted
in Fig.5, we only calculate the interference at boundary point
on the PZ because that all the boundary points are equivalent
due to symmetry and because any point on the boundary
receives more interference than the interior point. In other
words, the interference decreases as we go inside the PZ,
hence all PZ points experience interference less than ITH
if the interference calculated at y is less than ITH (see
Appendix C). Second, As the EZ and PZ are concentric, (10)
cannot be applied over all the values of r because between
r2   r1  r  r2 + r1 (Case1) not all the circumference of the
circle B(y, r) causes interference as a part of it hides inside
the EZ. However, when r2 + r1  1 (Case2), all of B(y, r)
cause interference at y as seen in Fig.5 and Fig.6. For each
case of r , we calculate the two interference values I1 and I2.
















Figure 6: Case 2: r2 + r1  1.
As mentioned earlier, the privacy increases when P(X =
x |x0) becomes uniform or in other words, when P(X =
x |x0) = 1/⇡r21 . Now, to maximize the privacy and limit the
interference, we use F1 to formulate the three-way tradeoff
which is equivalent to F2, i.e., they give the same solution




s.t. 0  r1  r2 (14)
(I1 + I2)  ITH ; 8y 2 PZ, (15)
where (14) makes sure that the PZ inside the EZ. Also, note
that by fixing r2, we solve for a certain OU utility as the
EZ represents the area that contains the OUs which will be
shutdown. (15) makes sure that the interference is below ITH .
POLP is a non-linear optimization problem because of
constraint (15). We propose the optimality condition decom-
position (OCD)-based method to solve POLP. Given that the
problem has a convex/concave objective function, OCD is an
iterative method that is proved to converge to the optimal
solution in a cubic time by trying to approach satisfying a
non-linear constraint, such as 15, by small steps represented
by iterative updates. The updating continuous until the update
Algorithm 2: OCD Algorithm
- Formulate the Lagrangian function
L(r1, µ) = ⇡r21 + µ(I1 + I2), where µ is a Lagrange
multiplier.
for t = 1, · · · ,T do
- Calculate the gradients rr1L(r1, µ) and r2r1L(r1, µ).
Then, solve the following equation for the updates 4r1
and 4µ of r1 and µ respectively
r2L(r1, µ) =  [4r1, 4µ]>rL(r1, µ). (11)
- Update r1 and µ as follows:
r1 = r1 + 4x, µ = µ + 4µ. (12)
- Check convergence






is zero, meaning that the constraint is met or until the update
is less than a very small threshold. Due to the complexity
of constraints, we present the detailed procedures of our
proposed OCD method in Algorithm 2. The OCD algorithm is
a modified version of the Lagrangian relaxation (LR) where we
solve the Newton equation in (11) to get the updates instead of
solving the dual Lagrangian problem as in (LR). The algorithm
converges to zero within a very 12 iterations at most as seen
in Fig. 11. The solution is considered to be optimal as the
updates converges to zero which happens in our case. Another
issue is how to choose the convergence constant ✏ . ✏ should be
chosen proportionally to the values of r1 and µ. For example
✏1 = 10 4 can be a good choice when r1 = 100, but it will be
not suitable when r1 = 10 and the same thing applies for µ.
Therefore, a safe choice is to select ✏1 to be very as small.
Algorithm 3: POL procedure
Input: x, ITH ,   and r2.
Step 1: The interference at the boundary of PZ is
calculated as the sum of interference in two cases:
1) Case 1: r2   r1  r  r2 + r1.
2) Case 2: r2 + r1  r  1.
Step 2: Solve POLP with inputs ITH ,   and r2, obtain r⇤1 .
Step 3: The perturbed location x0 is selected uniformly at
random from B(x, r⇤1 ), PZ is the disk B(x 0, r⇤1 ).
Step 4: The EZ is centered at x0 and has a radius of r2.
Output: IU outputs EZ, PZ and sends them to SAS.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the privacy, utility, interference


















































Figure 7: (a) Topology of a real-world deployment, (b) DOL: the three-way tradeoff, (c) POL: the three-way tradeoff.
A. The Tradeoff under the DOL model
For the DOL model, we consider the real-world scenario
depicted in Fig. 7(a). The IU is located inside a military base
with the PZ being divided into K = 12 cells. However, in
simulations, we range K from 1 to 100. For paper anonymity
purposes we do not reveal the true dataset used. This will
become available in the camera-ready version. The IU’s orig-
inal location x lies at the red pin. Thirteen base stations (blue
pins) that belong to different mobile operators represent OUs
whose locations are known. Google Maps was used to draw
this figure. For a cell j inside the PZ, we measure the distances
in kilometers and the interference and power in dBms. Using
the interference value at each cell, the IU solves the DOLP in
(6) and determines the set of OUs that are denied access so
that the ITH is satisfied, the privacy is implicitly achieved and
the OUs’ utility is maximized.
In Fig. 8, we show the total rate, derived by substituting the
optimal solution of (6) in it’s objective, as a function of ITH .
We observe that as ITH increases, the rate increases until it
saturates. In other words, the OUs can transmit at the same
rate for a much tighter ITH .
In Fig. 9, we show the rate as a function of Po, when ITH =
100dBm. We observe that increasing Po has the same effect
on the OU’s rate, as increasing the ITH .
In Fig. 10, we show the tradeoff between the OUs’ utility,
represented by rate, against the privacy level represented by
the number of privacy cells in the PZ. As we increase the
privacy, the average rate decreases due to the interference
constraint which leads to more OUs being denied access.
Fig. 7(b) shows the three-way tradeoff where we can see that
increasing privacy cells from 0 to 15 while tightening ITH
only degrades the rate by a small amount.
B. The Tradeoff under the POL Model
Simulating POL goes as follows. If we have chosen to fix
the EZ radius r2, first, we initialize r1,   by zeros. Second,
we calculate rr1L(r1, µ) and r2r1L(r1, µ) and solve (11) which
gives us the update values. Third, we update the current values
of r1, µ using 4r1 and 4µ and check for convergence. Note
that the distances in POL simulation are relative.
Fig. 11 shows the convergence of optimal r1. Typically, we
obtain the steady state value of r1 after 10 to 15 iterations.
In Fig. 12, we plot the ITH against the optimal r1 for dif-
ferent r2 values. We notice that as we allow more interference
from the OUs, the PZ radius r1 increase to approaches r2. In
other words, IU’s privacy (PZ area) increases to defy the effect
of increasing ITH . Specifically, as a reaction for increasing
ITH , r1 increases to decrease the chance that IU be on PZ’s
boundary has more interference. This case studies fixing a EZ
and trying to obtain the best PZ for it. On the other hand, to
have fixed PZ with controllable EZ, we can use F3 to formulate
POLP to calculate the optimal r2, like Fig. 13. We can see that
as the allowable interference ITH increases the EZ shrinks as
less OUs are required to shut down. Also, as Po increases, the
EZ expands to decrease the interference on the PZ.
In Fig. 14, we plot ITH against the ratio r1/r2. We can see
that as ITH increases, the ratio approaches 1, which is the
optimal condition we might have when the PZ and the EZ are
exactly the same. However, because the chance of having a
OUs close to the boundary of the PZ, and get close to IU, this
ratio never reaches 1 as (11) doesn’t have a solution.
In Fig. 15 and Fig. 16, we see the effect of increasing Po on
r1 and increasing   on r2. We can deduce that increasing Po
makes the PZ shrinks so that the IU be as far as possible from
the nearest interferer. However, increasing   is equivalent to
increase interference which is overcame by expanding r2.
In Fig. 7(c), we plot OUs’ lost transmission opportunity,
represented by EZ radius r2, against privacy, represented by
PZ radius r1 and interference. The area of EZ gives the relative
amount of OUs that are shut down which is an appropriate
complement measure of utility. In Fig. 7, we can see that
the lost opportunity and privacy are proportional meaning that
we can’t increase a quantity without decreasing the other. For
example, if we increase the utility, i.e., decreasing the EZ and
increasing the interference on the PZ, the PZ shrinks in order
to be as far as possible from the OUs and as a result the IU
privacy is compromised with having a smaller PZ.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the three-way tradeoff among
IU’s location privacy, interference, and the OUs’ utility. We
introduce the novel concept of a privacy zone within an
exclusion zone, to simultaneously achieve privacy and guar-
antee interference. Under two models with either known or
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Figure 8: ITH vs. Rate.




















Figure 9: Power level vs. Rate.
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Figure 10: PZ cells vs Rate.




















Figure 11: Iterations vs. r1 Conv.


















Figure 12: ITH vs. r1.



















Figure 13: ITH vs. r2.



















Figure 14: ITH vs. r1/r2 ratio.



















Figure 15: OU power (Po) vs. r1.


















Figure 16: r2 vs.  .
probabilistic OU locations, we derive optimized solutions to
minimize/maximize one of the objectives subject to two other
objectives given. The simulation results show that the the
IU’s privacy increases with the allowable interference. Also, it
shows that the OUs’ utility decrease as the privacy increases.
For future work, we will extend to mobile OU settings, and
consider privacy protection of the frequency and time domains
of IU’s operations. In addition, we will study the three-way
tradeoff from a game-theoretic perspective.
VII. APPENDIX
A. Case 1: r2   r1  r  r2 + r1
. We calculate the interference resulting from changing r
between [r2 r1, r2+r1] because before r2 r1, the interference
circle would be inside the EZ and after r2 + r1, the calculation
differs. Fig.5 shows case 1. To calculate the interference on






where Aarc is the circumference of the arc that results from
the intersection between the EZ and the interference circle (the
intersection is the solid red arc) and I1 is the interference in











The integration in (16) doesn’t have a closed form solution, so
we use the approximation used in [31] to have a closed form
integral. The approximation is given as follows:






This approximation gives an error margin less than 0.5% as
indicated in [31]. After substituting (18) in (17), setting ↵ = 3




















B. Case 2: r2 + r1  r  1
. In case 2, we calculate the interference beyond the arc of
case 1, i.e., the interference will be calculated for the OUs
exist on the complete circle at the center y. Fig.6 shows case






↵   2 . (20)
C. The Interior has less interference
To prove that the boundary of PZ has more interference than
its interior, we must prove that the I1 + I2 / r1.
Theorem VII.1. The interference is increasing with r1, in
other words, rr1 (I1 + I2) > 0
Proof. Using Leibniz rule we have:




















The integration I in (21) has no solution, so we take the
upper-bound of its denominator g(r1) in order to have a lower-
bound on I and hence, a lower bound on the gradient itself.
The upper bound on g(r1) is obtained by getting the maximum
value for r1 and then substitute back in g(r1). The upper bound
on g(r1) is 4r32 r
2r22 and After doing the integration I we have:
I = r1
3r2(r22   r21 )
. (22)
Consequently we have:





3r2(r22   r21 )
> 0. ⇤ (23)
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